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Since the mid-1960s, the United States has once more witnessed the
revival of mass immigration as a distinguishing feature of its economy.
A comprehensive study of U.S. society, conducted by an international team
of social science scholars and released in 1986, concluded that "America's
biggest import is people. II It added that lIat a time when attention is
directed to the general decline in American exceptionalism, American
immigration continues to flow at a rate unknown elsewhere in the world.1I1
Yet the data needed to assess the magnitude, composition, and, most
importantly, the economic impact of these immigrant flows has been repeatedly
found to be grossly inadequate. Indeed, a panel established by the National
Research Council to study the nation's immigration statistics chose to
subtitle its extensive report issued in 1985 as A Story of Neglect.2
The panel's findings capsulized the state of affairs as follows: "In recent
years, the expressions of concerns over inadequate, incomplete, and often
unreliable information available for use in planning, implementing, or
evaluating immigration policy have become both more numerous and more
strident. 113
The lack of adequate data has been a major explanation for the limited
amount of useful research that has been conducted on this vital subject and
for the persistent confusion surrounding attempts to interpret the findings
2of that which have been produced. The void also explains why research has
played an insignificant role in the past design and the on-going efforts
to reform the nation's immigration system.
The pUrPOse of this paper, however, is not to re-open an old wound just
to throw salt in it. The lack of useful labor force data on immigrants has
been a serious obstacle to public discussion and policy formulation. It
stills is. Some changes have been made. More must be forthcoming. On the
optimistic side, one could interpret the text commentary of the 1986
Statistical Yearbook published by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(I.N.S.) in October 1987 as a public
~
culpa for the agencies past
indifference to the importance of data collection to policy formulation and
the conduct of research.4 In this particular publication -- the predecessors
of which have been but an annual series of statistical tables, there is a
lengthy written prolog. In this introductory material, the major components
of the annual immigrant flow to the United States are listed and discussed.
Each part contains three subsections entitled "data overview," "data
collection", and "limitations of data". In addition, there is a general
section entitled "data gaps" that pertains to an overall perspective on
immigration measurement issues. Hence, the government agency responsible
for the conduct of the immigration system has initiated a frank dialog with
the users of its data pertaining to legal immigrants, refugees, asylees,
and nonimmigrants who are admitted for temporary work. There is another
section in this report devoted to enforcement data as it pertains to the
thorny measurement issues surrounding illegal immigrants. These discussions,
however, serve essentially as warnings to users rather than as answers to
the data needs of researchers and policy makers. They focus primarily on
3the quantitative measurement issues surrounding the number of persons involved
in each of these separate streams of new arrivals. They provide little
insight into what actually happens after they arrive. Indeed, the entire
review serves to indicate how little data information there is about their
actual labor market features and impacts.
The Process of Immigration Reform
Public recognition that immigration has once again assumed an important
role in the u.s. economy has only been slowly recognized. Immigration had
declined in importance from the 1920s through to the mid-1960s. The foreign
born as a percentage of the population had fallen from 13.2 percent in 1920
to 4.7 percent in 1970. But since the mid-1960s there has been a sharp trend
reversal. The foreign born population in 1980 rose to 6.2 percent of the
population and the figure for 1990 could easily approach 9 percent. Even
these percentages are suspected of being too low due to charges of significant
undercount of illegal immigrants by the 1980 Census and the anticipation
of similar problems in the 1990 Census.s
The myriad of causes for the re-emergence of mass immigration to the
United states is beyond the scope of this paper.6 Suffice to say, that when
a congressionally created and presidentially appointed commission on
immigration reported in 1981 that "U.S. immigration policy was out of
control", there were few who would argue with the conclusion (although many
disagreed about what to do about it).7 The commission warned that the nation
must face "the reality of limitations" and that it should adopt "a cautious
approach" in the design of its immigration policies. In this context, the
Congress -- after dismissing a reform package offered by the Reagan
Administration in 1981 as being inadequate -- began its own efforts to craft
4a comprehensive immigration reform law. The complexity of the topic and
the ensuing controversies that surrounded the proposed reforms caused these
legislative attempts to fail in 1982 and again in 1984. In the ensuing
session of Congress a new political tact was taken: piecemeal reform.
The first issue that was identified for attention was the mass abuse
of the system by illegal immigrants. Although it took until literally the
final hours of that entire legislative session to accomplish, the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (i.e., the Simpson-Rodino Act) was finally
passed by Congress and signed into law by President Reagan on November 6,
1986. This historic legislation linked the imposition of sanctions against
employers who hire illegal immigrants with four separate amnesty programs
that will allow millions of illegal immigrants (and, ultimately, unknown
millions of additional family members who will be able to legally accompany
them) to adjust their status to become permanent resident aliens and,
eventually, to become naturalized citizens.
With this initial task completed, Congress has subsequently turned its
attention to reform of the legal immigration system. In March 1988 the Senate
adopted its version of a new reform bill and the House of Representatives
is considering a somewhat similar bill whose status is pending at the time
of this writing. Both bills would significantly increase the number of legal
immigrants admitted each year. While overwhelmingly most immigrants would
still be admitted on the basis of family re-unification principles, the number
who would be admitted on the basis of labor market needs and potential
employment adaptability would be increased. This would be accomplished by
establishing a point system to set immigrant priorities for many (but not
all) non-family related immigrants. The points would be awarded for such
5productivity factors as English fluency; possessing skills for which
occupational shortages exist; work experience; and educational attainment.
The Senate bill also seeks to set an overall cap on total legal immigration
(excluding, however, refugee flows). If agreement with the House of
Representatives cannot be reached this year, the topic is certain to be
revived in the next session.
In future years, it is also anticipated that additional incremental
steps toward reform will be taken by Congress to address major problems
associated with refugee, asylee, and non-immigrant policies. Thus, the
immigration reform process promises to be a protracted affair that will extend
well into the 1990s and, perhaps, even beyond.
Thus, to date, immigration reform has only been partially attempted.
It consists only in the enacted provisions of the Simpson-Rodino Act. But
even the effectiveness of the adopted reforms remains to be demonstrated.
There is ample reason to fear that its provisions to address illegal
immigration may be grossly inadequate. There is the massive identification
loophole in the legislation (the employer is not responsible for the
authenticity of the documents presented by would-be workers); there is serious
doubt that there will be adequate manpower and funds to make enforcement
meaningful; and there is no attention in this law to the powerful "push"
factors involved in the illegal immigration process (e.g., poverty, political
corruption, human rights violations, and excess population pressures) that
will continue to function.
The effects of immigration reform on data issues, therefore, are limited
to the effects of the Simpson-Rodino Act on the stock and flow of illegal
immigrants in the population and labor force. The amnesty provisions of
6the Act are designed to reduce the size of the stock of illegal immigrants
while the employer sanctions seek to reduce the size of future flows. The
fact that the amnesty provisions transform the status of illegal immigrants
into temporary resident aliens who eventually can become permanent resident
aliens and, later, naturalized citizens means that over 2 million former
illegal aliens no longer exist. In theory at least, these persons should
be easier to count in government data collection efforts since they no longer
need to fear detection and possible deportation. In fact, however, most
amnesty recipients seem to be both minority group members and workers in
low wage and low skilled occupations. Both of these groups are also subject
to significant statistical undercount in government population and labor
market surveys. Hence, there is no real assurance that any real progress
will result in the improvement of official data reporting. As for the ability
of employer sanctions to stem the future flow of illegal immigrants, it is
unlikely -- for the reasons cited in the previous paragraph -- they will
have much impact. Thus, it can be anticipated that the flow will continue
and, in the process, that the stock of illegal immigrants will soon be
replenished. The new flows will join the ranks of the numerous illegal
immigrants who did not avail themselves of the opportunity to adjust their
status and those others who were ineligible for any of the four amnesty
programs provided under the legislation. Hence, all the data questions
concerning the size and characteristics of the illegal immigrant population
can be expected to quickly re-kindle. In the process, the adequacy of the
governments population and labor force data will continue to be the subject
of academic articles, professional meetings, and congressional hearings.
7Immigration and Urban Labor Markets
There is one descriptive characteristic of the "fourth wave" of
immigration to the United States (i.e., post-1965 immigrants) that is not
in dispute by anyone. It is that" immigration is overwhelmingly an urban
phenomenon."e In 1980, 92 percent of the foreign born population counted
by the Census lived in metropolitan areas compared to 74 percent of the native
born population. Because of concealment concerns, it is an uncontested
behavioral in the research literature fact that most illegal immi-
grants -- whether counted or not -- are also in urban labor markets. It
follows logically, therefore, that it is the urban labor markets that have
borne disproportionately the accommodation burden of contemporary immigration
flows. The actual urban impact itself, however, is far more geographically
concentrated. Immigration is not a random process. Indeed, it affects
essentially only the urban labor markets in a handful of States (in
California, New York, Texas, Florida, Illinois and New Jersey).9 These
"affected" central cities (i.e., New York City, Los Angeles, Chicago, San
Francisco, Miami, Houston, and San Antonio and various cities in Northern
New Jersey), however, account for a substantial portion of the nation's total
urban labor force.
But simply noting the settlement patterns of the foreign born population
does not help to understand the actual effect of immigration on urban labor
markets. It is at this point that the data shortcomings become starkly
apparent. It is only Census information that provides labor force data on
the foreign born. But immigration in all of its diverse forms is an on-going
and increasing phenomenon. Census data, however, are collected only every
10 years. As indicated earlier, the foreign born population increased by
8over 45 percent between 1970 and 1980. Given the immigration-related events
of the 1980s, it is certain that the 1990 Census will show even greater
absolute and percentage increases. No other labor market data suffers from
such rapid obsolescence. Aside from being largely aggregate data, the
available statistical information is grossly inadequate to meaningful attempts
to assess the labor market significance of immigration. The Current
Population Survey (CPS), which is a monthly household sample of the population
and labor force, provides no data on the foreign born on a regular basis.
Nor do the other two monthly labor force surveys (i.e., the Establishment
Survey of employers or the Unemployment Insurance Survey of unemployment
claimants). On rare occasions when special funding is arranged, a special
survey is included as part of one of the monthly CPS surveys but it is highly
aggregate in its tabulation and irregularly available.1O
Hence, there is no up-to-date or reliable way to measure such basic
concerns as the effects of immigration on the size and personal
characteristics of the labor force (gender, race, or age) or their particular
industrial, occupational, or geographic patterns. Nor is there any regular
measurement of labor force status -- employment, unemployment, or labor force
participation -- of immigrants. Likewise, measures of the largest annual
flow of immigrant workers -- i.e., illegal immigrants -- are simply
unavailable in any data series. As for the growing number of non-immigrant
workers who are legally allowed to work in the United States for specified
time periods, only labor market data of an aggregate nature are published.
Much of this data are incomplete with respect to their actual industrial,
occupational, geographic employment patterns.
9with regard to the substantial amnesty programs that were initiated
as part of the Simpson-Rodino Act, there are detailed numbers prepared by
I.N.S. on the gross number of applicants, their personal characteristics,
their countries of origin and states of residency but only minimal information
was gathered on their labor force characteristics and status. The amnesty
labor force data classifications are so broad as to be almost useless for
analysis. For example, the interim report issued in December 1987 on amnesty
applicants lumped unemployed and retired persons in the
~
category; it
reported 22 percent of the amnesty applicants as having "unknown" labor force
status or occupation; and it listed only very broad occupational
classifications to describe the actual employment patterns of the remainder.11
The almost total absence of labor market data on immigrants means that
all of the critically important derivative policy issues that affect urban
market operations are either unknown or in serious contention among analysts
and scholars. Among these critical concerns are the differential employment
patterns of the different immigrant grouping (i.e., of legal immigrants,
illegal immigrants, refugees, and non-immigrant workers); the collective
employment patterns of all immigrants; the collective impact of immigrants
on employment opportunities, wages, and working conditions of native born
workers (actual and potential); the selective impact on local businesses;
the collective utilization of public services by immigrants; or the overall
fiscal and economic consequences of a growing immigrant population at the
municipal, state, or national level. Likewise, the effects of the growth
of linguistically similar employment enclaves on the job opportunities for
immigrants from the
~
group, for immigrants from other groups, and for
native born workers who collectively seek jobs in the same urban labor markets
10
has yet to be carefully analyzed. Worse yet, the political milieu that
encompasses the formulation of immigration policy often does not want to
know the answers as to the labor market effects of immigration. Politically,
the topic of responsible immigration policy is "too hot to handle." It is
perceived as being "insensitive at best" and "racist at worst" in many
localities even to raise the issue of labor market effects of immigrants.12
Systemic Barriers to Improved Immigration Data
The data problems associated with the nation's immigration policies
are endemic to the nature of the current immigration system. They stem from
two institutional factors. First and foremost is the fact that the extant
immigration policy of the United States has evolved in such a manner as to
be permitted to be largely unaccountable for its economic consequences.
It is fundamentally a political policy. The legal immigration system admits
most immigrants on nepotistic bases (i.e., 80 percent of the annually
available visas are tied to family reunification standards). Only 20 percent
of the visas are linked to labor market needs that are certified by the u.S.
Department of Labor. In addition, the refugee and asylee admission procedures
are, by virtual definition, unaffected in their design by prevailing labor
market considerations. Moreover, the participants in the largest component
of the immigrant flow -- illegal immigrants -- simply ignore considerations
as to whether they are needed, whether they displace actual citizen workers,
or whether they discourage labor force participation by potential citizen
workers. As noted earlier, there is little reason to believe that the
Simpson-Rodino Act in its present form will prove to be very effective in
stemming the flow of illegal immigrants. The past permissiveness that
tolerated mass abuse of the law has institutionalized migration patterns
11
that are likely to continue. Hence, the application of immigration policy
itself does little to generate a need for reliable labor market data on
immigrants and their collective economic impact.
Secondly, the location of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
in the Department of Justice (DOJ) and under the supervision of the judiciary
committees of Congress virtually assures that there is little or no interest
in the economic impact of immigration. To redress this situation, the I.N.S.
should be shifted back to the u.S. Department of Labor (DOL) which had this
responsibility from its inception as an organization in 1914 until 1940.
In the process, congressional oversight should be shifted to the labor and
human resource committees of Congress. Ostensibly, the rationale for the
organizational shift in 1940 was based on temporary national security
considerations stemming from fears about foreign subversives entering the
nation on the eve of entry into World War II. When the war ended, however,
immigration policy was not returned to DOL. It remained with DOJ -- the
most politically-sensitive agency and the most legalistically-oriented agency
in government. As a consequence, the type of data that is forthcoming from
I.N.S. pertains largely to enforcement issues rather than to economic
concerns. Data are collected to reflect conformance to the six preference
categories, the overall annual ceiling, the individual nation quotas, the
numerically unrestricted number of immediate family members accompanying
an immigrant visa holder, and compliance with the thirty-three exclusion
restrictions of the legal immigration laws. The same can be said for the
data describing adherence to the annually set ceiling and geographic
distribution restrictions that pertain to refugee admissions as well as the
data reporting the number of persons admitted under the 13 separate
12
non-immigrant admission categories. For illegal immigrants, the only useful
information that is regularly available pertains to the annual number of
apprehensions and their homelands. There is no imposed necessity to provide
data on the employment and income effects relevant to the operation of the
overall system nor has their been any voluntary effort by I.N.S. to gather
such information. It is not difficult to see why meaningful economic data
is absent.
Concluding Observations
Thus, any alleged benefits of immigration reform to date have yet to
permeate the realm of labor force data needs. As a consequence, the
significant influences that immigration policy in all of its diverse
manifestations is exerting on urban labor markets can only be inferred and
imagined. They cannot be ascertained.
I see little hope for changing the current data collection priorities
until immigration policy is recognized for what it actually is -- an element
of national economic policy that significantly influences the size and
composition of the nation's labor force -- and the responsibility for
administering immigration policy is returned to its logical base -- in the
u.s. Department of Labor or some new super agency associated with human
resource development in its entirety. Then -- and only then -- can
immigration policy be held accountable for its sizeable economic consequences
on the nation's urban labor markets.
13
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